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lion would protect the creditors against such arbitrary action by the director.
The trend in recent years has been toward more strict recognition of the
fiduciary duties of the corporation director. The earlier condonation of "arms
length" dealings between director and stockholders, has been replaced by the
imposition of a fiduciary duty where the director has acted inequitably.26 In
addition, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 forbids "quick turns" in securi-
ties by directors.17  The Manufacturers Trust case is an exception to the
previous strict enforcement of the fiduciary obligations of directors of in-
solvent corporations.2 8 The decision encourages the director to place his
personal interest above that of the corporation, employee, creditor, and com-
munity. In discouraging such a result Judge Hand has adopted the better
view and has declared "before accepting the excuse in the case of debts, I
would put the burden on the director of proving, not only that he genuinely
expected by a composition to continue the business, but that his expectation
was well founded; and nothing short of both would serve as an excuse. '29
CORPORATIONS
RETROACTIVE COMPENSATION TO DIRECTOR-OFFICERS
A generally accepted tenet of corporate law has long prohibited compen-
sation to director-officers for past services.1 Early cases required that the
provisions for compensation be included within a formal authorization prior
to the rendition of services. 2 Modern courts found the requirement satisfied
by an "implied agreement" where there had been an oral or tacit understanding
26. See note 6 supra.
27. 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1940). "Quick turns" refer to any
profit realized by a person from transactions within a period of six months in securities
issued by a corporation in which he is an officer, director or major stockholder. The Act
provides that such profit shall inure to the benefit of the corporation.
28. See note 11 supra.
29. See, In re Calton Crescent, 173 F.2d 944, 952 (2d Cir. 1949) (dissenting opinion).
1. The rule is aptly stated in Crichton v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 177, 36 So.
926, 932 (1904) where the court said, "The salaries fixed are not too large, but the
resolutions fixing them can, as a matter of course, have operation only in the future."
Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Maux Ferry Gravel
Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 36 (1872) ; 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS 449 (perm.
ed. 1931); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 758 (2d ed. 1949); BALLENTINE, COR'ORATIONS 187
(rev. ed. 1946); WASHINGTON, CORPORATE ExECUTIvES' COMIPENSATION 188 (1942). Of
course, unanimous ratification by the stockholders would make retroactive compensation
valid. Boyum v. Johnson, 127 F.2d 491 (D. Minn. 1942) ; Godley v. Crandall, Godley Co.,
212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914) ; Kreitner v. Burweger, 174 App. Div. 48, 160 N. Y.
Supp. 256 (1916). A few courts have allowed ratification by a majority of the stock-
holders, although the effect of this is to undermine the rule against retroactive compensa-
tion in many instances. Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. 113, 81 Ad. 136
(1911) ; Tefft v. Schaefer, 136 Wash. 391, 239 Pac. 837 (1925).
2. Maux Ferry Gravel Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361 (1872) ; Klein v. Independent
Brewing Co., 231 Ill. 594, 83 N. E. 434 (1907) ; Godley v. Crandall, Godley Co. 212 N. Y.
121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914).
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as to remuneration upon which the officer had relied.3 And the "outside
services" doctrine was developed to condone compensation for the perform-
ance of past services which were clearly outside the scope of the officer's
usual duties.' Pervading all the cases, however, is the requirement of some
type of prior agreement if the compensation is to be regarded as something
more than a mere gift.' The time of the agreement, rather than the time of
payment, is the governing factor.6
A decision of the Delaware Supreme Court has repudiated, or at least
seriously qualified the established prohibition of retroactive compensation
and has introduced an added threat to stockholder security by adopting a
criterion of "reasonableness" to determine the validity of unbargained-for
compensation.
7
3. In these cases there was clearly an agreement for compensation prior to the
services, although there had been no formal authorization by the directors. Church v.
Harnit, 35 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1929) cert. denm 281 U. S. 732 (1929) ; Sotter v. Coatsville
Boiler Wks., 257 Pa. 411, 101 Atl. 744 (1917) ; 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS 385,
451 (perm. ed. 1931); BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS 192 (rev. ed. 1946). See Boyum v.
Johnson, 127 F.2d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 1942).
4. Kenton v. Wood, 56 Ariz. 325, 107 Pac. 380 (1940) ; Morris v. North Evanston
Bldg. Corp., 319 Ill. App. 298, 49 N. E.2d 647 (1943) ; 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA COrORA-
TION S 387 (perm. ed. 1931) ; BALLENTINE, COm'ORATIONS 188 (rev. ed. 1946). It should
be noted that this doctrine does not apply when the ordinary duties are performed un-
usually well. Huffake et al. v. Kreiger's Assignees, 21 Ky L. gep. 887, 53 S. W. 288
(1899).
5. This is not to say that director-officers cannot make donations of corporate funds.
Gifts to charity and other subscriptions have been upheld when they served a business
purpose. Fort Worth City Co. v. Smith Bridge Co., 51 U. S. 294 (1894) (payment to
get desirable location for bridge) ; State Bd. of Agric. v. Citizens State R. Co., 47 Ind.
407 (1874) (donation to fix site of state fair near streetcar tracks) ; Steinway v. Stein-
way Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N. Y. Supp. 718 (1896) (advertising value). From the fore-
going it can be seen that pure gifts "for the sake of giving" are not tolerated. In 6 FLT-
CHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2940 (perm. ed. 1931) it was said, "The modern rule of
the majority of the courts recognizes the power of a business corporation to make sub-
scriptions and donations . . . in the expectation of receiving a pecuniary benefit therefrom
or furthering business interests . . ." Note, 31 COL. L. REv. 136 (1931).
6. The scope of this discussion includes only compensation paid to director-officers.
In the case of ordinary employees courts have been more disposed to allow extra com-
pensation. Neff v. Gas & E Shop, 232 Ky. 66, 22 S. W.2d 265 (1929) (bonuses upheld
when employees did not contract for them) ; BALLENTINE CORPORATIONS 191, 192 (rey. ed.
1946). The courts have reasoned that there is little likelihood of fraud, since em-
ployees have no control over business policy, and at the same time certain benefits accrue
to the corporation when the bonuses are granted from year to year. Cf. Putnam v. Ju-
venile Shoe Corp., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W. 593 (1925). By the same reasoning bonuses
granted when a corporation is about to go out of business have been denied. Warren v.
Lambeth Waterworks, 21 Times L. R. 685, 25 E. E. Dig. 503 (1905) ; cf. Atl. City and
Suburban Gas and Fuel Co. v. Johnson, 81 N. J. Eq. 351, 88 Ati. 163 (1912).
7. The "standard of reasonableness" has been used often by the courts in determining,
the validity of the amount of compensation paid under a prospective agreement. Rogers
v. Hill 289 U. S. 582, (1933) (compensation must bear a reasonable relation to the
value of the services) ; Gray Co. v, United States, 35 F.2d 958 (Ct. Cl. 1929) ; WASHING-
TON, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES' COMAPENSATION, 194-216 (1942) ; Notes, 25 N. CAR. L. REv_
479 (1947), 17 MINN. L. REv. 433 (1933).
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In 1939, Maguire became a major stockholder, director, and president
of the Thompson Automatic Arms Corporation. Due to his skillful financial
maneuvers and acumen in production management (with perhaps an assist
from the war which aided the sub-machine gun market considerably), the
company, previously on the brink of collapse, became a huge success. Salary
increases were voted to Maguire in March, 1940, and in March, 1941, each
being made retroactive for several months. In a stockholder's derivative
suit Blish, a minority stockholder, complained that the retroactive features
of the compensation were void and constituted spoilation and waste of corpor-
ate assets.8 Although there was no finding that the extra compensation had
been agreed upon in advance, the Delaware Supreme Court held the increases
valid under an "exception" to the general rule against retroactive remuneration
where the amount awarded is not unreasonable in view of the services
rendered. Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corporation, 64 A.2d 581
(Del. 1948).
In holding that Thompson's directors had the power to grant themselves
retroactive pay increases,' the court relied upon three earlier decisions. In
Osborne v. United Gas Improvement Co.1" a pension plan was attacked as
begin retroactive in operation. However, the court pointed out that the issue
of retroactivity was not controlling, for the pension plan had been authorized
by statute, and was valid by virtue of legislative authority. In Wyles v.
Campbell1" and Koplar v Warner Bros. Pictures2 the compensation in
question was obviously not retroactive in operation, having been bargained
for in the employment contract. The rule of reasonableness was quite
properly invoked to determine whether the amount of the compensation was
8. Blish also charged that attorney's fees paid by the corporation in a former deriva-
tive suit against Maguire should have been paid by Maguire personally. A note in 63
HARV. L. Rav. 351 (1949) discusses this aspect of the case and concludes that even though
the suit was against Maguire for his activities as promoter and underwriter, the cor-
poration was entitled to reimburse him the costs of his defense. From the facts pre-
sented in the opinion by the court it is not clear whether the corporation actually did re-
imburse Maguire. Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corporation, 64 F.2d 581, 607
(Del. 1948). If so, it is the first case where a promoter-underwriter has been allowed
reimbursement from the corporation of costs of defending a derivative suit involving
the corporation.
9. It might appear that the "outside services" doctrine would apply, for the court
spoke of Maguire's services as being "extraordinary." Blish v. Thompson Automatic
Arms Corp. 64 A.2d 581, 607 (Del. 1948). However, Maguire performed no more than
his duties called for, and the fact that he was proficient would not invoke the outside
services doctrine. See cases cited note 4 supra.
10. 354 Pa. 57, 46 A.2d 208 (1946) (pension to all employees, including director-
officers).
11. 77 F. Supp. 343 (D. D. C. 1948) (compensation to an executive not a director).
12. 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1937) (compensation to director-officers).
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justified as a matter of business policy. In none of these cases, then, was
retroactive compensation appraised under the standard of reasonableness" s
The inadequacy of cited authority alone is not to condemn a decision
that speaks well for itself, but the Delaware court, talking in terms of
"reasonableness" has ignored the basic considerations underlying the rule
against retroactive compensation. This prohibition was conceived from a
fear that director-officers, as fiduciaries in control of the corporate purse
strings,'" might allow their personal appetites to prevail over the stockholders'
interests.' 5 Accordingly, the courts required the officers to show a justifiable
reason for paying out the corporate assets.16 To be more than a gift, the
compensation must serve some business purpose which will operate as a
substantial benefit to the corporation. Because Maguire's services here were
more beneficial than anticipated, it does not follow that the corporation was
benefited by paying the added compensation. It is only where the provisions
for extra compensation are included within a prospective agreement that
certain benefits to the corporation become apparent. The director-officer
13. The "exception" applied by the court, "where the compensation is not unreason-
able in the light of the services rendered," was possibly taken from an annotation on the
subject in 164 A. L. R. 1133 where the same words are used. However, the cases cited
there make it clear that the "circumstances" must include some sort of prior agreement.
Boyum v. Johnson, 127 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1942) (bonus denied because there was no prior
agreement) ; Balch v. Investors Royalty Co. 7 F. Supp. 420 (N. D. Okla. 1934) (bonus
denied-no prior agreement) ; Wiseman v. Musgrave, 309 Mich. 523, 16 N. W.2d 60
(1944) (extra pay upheld under outside services doctrine) ; Wineburgh v. Seeman Bros.,
21 N. Y. S.2d 180 (S. Ct. N. Y. County 1940) (bonus upheld-implied agreement present).
14. Courts have disagreed as to the legal status of corporate director-officers. Some
have said they hold a "position of trust": Stevenson v. Sicklesteel Lbr. Co., 219 Mich.
18, 188 N. W. 499 (1922) ; A. J. Anderson Co. v. Kinsolving, 262 S. W. 150 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1924) ; Steeple v. Max Kiner Co., 121 Wash. 47, 208 Pac. 44 (1922). Some courts
have labeled them "trustees": Ellis v. Ward, 137 Ill. 509, 25 N. E. 530 (1890) ; Williams
v. McKay, 40 N. J. Eq. 189 (1832); Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163
(1901) ; 3 FLETCHER, CYcLOPEDIA PRIvATE CORPORATIONS § 838 (perm. ed. 1931). Other
courts have called them "agents": Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, (1891); New
Haven Tr. Co. v. Doherty, 75 Conn. 555, 54 Atl. 209 (1903) ; BALLENTINE, PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS 359 (1927). For an excellent discussion of the whole problem see Uhlman,
The Legal Status of Corporation Directors, 19 B. U. L. REv. 12 (1939) ; Johnson, Cor-
porate Directors as Trustees in Illinois, 23 ILL. L. REv. 653 (1928). But despite different
labels, all courts agree that director-officers have a fiduciary duty. McEwen v. Kelley,
140 Ga. 720, 79 S. E. 777 (1913) ; Touchett Inc. v. Touchett, 264 Mass. 499, 163 N. E.
184 (1928) ; BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 221
et seq. (1934) ; WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN INCORPORATED, 124 et seq. (1931).
15. In Davoue v. Fanning, 1 Chanc. Rep. 251 (N. Y. 1816), Chancellor Kent pointed
out, "The inquiry is not whether there was, or was not, fraud in fact. It is to guard
against the uncertainty and hazard of abuse, and to remove the trustee from tempta-
tion . . ." Butts v. Wood, 37 N. Y. 319 (1867); Steeple v. Max Kiner Co., 121 Wash.
47, 208 Pac. 44 (1922) ; 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPoRATioNS 415 (perm. ed. 1931).'
16. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145,
1146 (1932), "it is undoubtedly the traditional view that a corporation is an association of
stockholders founded for their private gain and to be managed by its board of directors
solely with that end in view." However, there seems to be a trend away from the "tradi-
tional view." See note 23 infra. I I
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then acts upon an expectation of future remuneration which is directly related
to his own efforts. This expectation provides an incentive 7 to him, and
both he and the corporation benefit from his success. Further, the "holding
out" of extra compensation, especially when based on profits or sales, assists
the corporation in attracting" and retaining9 proficient executives. Retro-
active compensation, by definition, lacks these ingredients. Consequently,
the general rule has denied to director-officers the power to award themselves
unexpected pay for past services.
Even the "rule of reason" applied by the Delaware court should strike
down retroactive compensation since it confers no benefit upon the corpora-
tion.20 The danger in applying this test, one borne out by the Maguire de-
cision, is that the use of the word "reasonable" is conducive to the erroneous
assumption that director-officers, under some circumstances, may have the
power to compensate themselves retroactively. That this is no fanciful hazard
is illustrated by the disrepute into which the test of reasonableness has fallen
in its own bailiwick, prospective compensation. Concededly, there have been
many instances where directors have voted what would seem to be unreason-
able salaries to themselves and yet their action has been sustained by the
17. In Diamond v. Davis et al, 38 N. Y. S.2d 103, 113 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1942)
the court said that a properly authorized bonus may be granted "as an incentive to retain
his services, sharpen his interest, intensify his zeal, spur him on to more ardent effort in
the interest and for the benefit of the company . . ." Marsh v. Arch Rib Truss Co.,
56 Cal. App.2d. 811, 33 P.2d 412 (1943) ; In re Woods Estate, 299 Mich. 635, 1 N. W2d
19 (1941).
18. In Wyles v. Campbell, supra note 11, the court found, "Mr. Campbell was un-
willing to come to Valspar unless he should have an opportunity to acquire a stock interest
in the corporation in case of his success in its operation." McQuillen v. Nat'l Cash
Register Co., 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 695 (1941) (discussion
of the benefits of an incentive contract) ; Bennett v. Madison Sales Co., 264 Ky. 728, 95
S. W.2d 604 (1936) ; BALLENTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 194 (rev. ed. 1946).
19. Wyles v. Campbell, supra note 11; Meyers v. Cowden, 47 N. Y. S.2d 471 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester County 1944). Today, with proficient executives at a premium, a com-
pensation plan which will retain good executives is highly beneficial to the corporation.
WASHINGTON, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION '3 (1942); DITAOCK AND HYDE,
BUREAUCRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN LARGE CORPORATIONS 108 (T.N.E.C. MONOGRAPH 11
1940).
20. Only three cases have been found where the court spoke in terms of "reasonable-
ness" where retroactive compensation was involved. Ransome Concrete Mach. Co. v.
Moody, 282 Fed. 29 (2d Cir. 1922) said that in the absence of actual fraud retroactive
compensation may be valid, depending on the facts. The facts were that there had been
an informal agreement prior to the services, and later formal authorization approving
the prior action. In Matthews v. Headley Choc. Co., 130 Md. 522, 100 Atl. 645 (1917)
the court spoke in terms of "reasonableness," but the real ground of the decision was the
fact that the complaining stockholders had purchased their shares after the transactions
in question had occurred. In Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, Case and Boyce, 124 Misc.
480, 209 N. Y. Supp. 258 (1925) the creditors of the corporation brought the suit, but the
directors owned all the stock and had ratified their own actions. At least two cases have
held compensation which was retroactive only for a short period "reasonable" under the
principle of de minimis. Francis v. Brigham Hopkins Co., 108 Md. 233, 70 Atl. 95 (1908);
Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. 113, 81 Atl. 136 (1911).
RECENT CASES
courts as reasonable because of the vagueness of the standard and the extreme
reluctance to substitute judicial for managerial discretion. 21 This has resulted
in an allowance to the directors of almost unlimited power over the disposition
of corporate funds. Such an amorphism is not a suitable replacement for the
definite and easily applied standard of the flat prohibition against retroactive
compensation.
Recent years have seen the apparently unlimited legislative and judicial
extension of the powers of the corporate director. 22  Few, indeed, are the
safeguards left to protect the shell of ownership retained by the stockholders. 23
A cursory examination of the investment market reveals a paucity of needed
risk capital, which in part has resulted from an awareness by the investor
that the risks of loss will fall upon him while the management will take the
cream of any prosperity.24 Decisions like that in Maguire point up the
21. Seitz v. Union Brass, Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N. W. 586 (1922);
Heller v. Boylan, 29 N. Y. S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1941) ; Holmes v. Republic
Steel Corp., 69 N. E.2d 396 (C. P1. Ohio 1946) ; Washington, The Corporate Executive's
Living Wage, 54 HARV. L. RP.v. 733 (1941); Note, 25 N. CAR. L. REV. 479 (1947).
22. The following states have placed legislative restrictions on bringing stockholder's
derivative suits, either by requiring the stockholder to own a minimum amount of stock,
or that the stock have a minimum market value: California (CALIF. STAT. 1949, c. 499, ef-
fective Oct. 1, 1949) ; New York (N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 61 b) ; New Jersey (N. J.
REv. STAT., Cum. Supp. 14:3-15, N.J.S.A. 14:3-15); Pennsylvania (PENN. STAT. ANN.
[Purdon, Supp. 1945] title 12 § 1322) ; Wisconsin (WISC. STAT. [1945] § 180.13 [31]).
The purpose of these acts is to prevent merely harrassing suits where the complainant
has no substantial interest. In effect, however, the statutes also drastically restrict the
minority shareholders' ability to protect their interests. Ballentine, Abuses of Share-
holder's Derivative Suits: How Far is California's New 'Security for Expenses' Act
Sound Regulations?, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 399 (1949) ; Hornstein, New aspects of Stock-
holder's Derivative Suits: the Company's Role, and a Suggestion, 25 CORN. L. Q. 361
(1940).
Minority shareholders have found the courts equally reluctant to entertain stock-
holder's suits, or if they do, to give relief in recent years. Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan
Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949) ; Otis Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E. D. Pa. 1944) ;
Stella v. Kaiser, 87 F. Supp. 525 (S. D. N. Y. 1949) ; Notes, 31 VA. L. REV. 695 (1945),
45 YALE L. J. 661 (1934); Frey, Noteworthy Decisions in the Law of Private Corpora-
tions: 194o-1945, 94 U. oF PA. L. REV. 265 (1946) ; see note 21 supra.
23. BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN COR'OATIO N AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 68 (1932)
"the owner of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership, while the power,
the responsibility and substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past
are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control." Comment, 47
MICH. L. REV. 547 (1949); Notes, 17 FoRDHAm L. RrV. 259 (1949), 25 N. CAR. L. REv.
479 (1948).
Perhaps one reason for this trend is the lack of stockholder interest which typifies
the average corporation, DIMOCK AND HYDE, BUREAUCRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN LARGE
CoaORATIONs 114 (T.N.E.C. MONOGRAPH 11, 1940). However, lack of interest on the part
of the stockholders should not influence the courts ,vhere a stockholder does try to enforce
his rights.
24. "A dynamic enterprise system requires a large and continuing flow of capital into
new plants. It requires that the capital be 'take a chance' capital-capital provided by
those willing to assume the risk . . . This kind of capital can only be provided out of
the savings of individuals . . . It cannot be provided by institutional investors . . .
"For some years now individuals have been furnishing a deplorably small proportion
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necessity of retaining the rule against retroactive compensation in all its vigor
as one of the needed bulwarks against the further decline in the supply of risk
capital.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMPENSATED EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO SUE PHYSICIAN FOR
AGGRAVATION
Despite a general tendency to construe Workmen's Compensation statutes
liberally for the benefit of employees, the majority of courts have reached
the result that an injured workman who accepts compensation is precluded
from suing a physician for negligent aggravation of the original injury.1 This
result has recently been adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia.
Makarenko broke his arm in the course of his employment at a coal mine.
Because of Dr. Scott's negligence in treating the injury, the bone had to be
refractured in an effort to properly align the arm. The treatment failed
and the arm was permanently deformed. Makarenko's employer was a
subscriber to the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Fund, and com-
pensation was awarded for both the original injury and the aggravation.
The payments were based upon a fifteen per cent permanent disability. In
addition, medical expenses of nearly $300 were paid from the fund. After
accepting this award, Makarenko sought to recover $20,000 from Dr. Scott
for the deformity and accompanying pain resulting from the negligent treat-
ment. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that Makarenko,
having accepted compensation, was precluded from suing Dr. Scott. Mak-
arenko v. Scott et al., 55 S. E. 2d 88 (W. Va. 1949).
of risk capital nourishing our economy." The Forgotten Men, 21 THE OUTLOOK (Standard
and Poor's) 970 (1949).
High taxes are, of course, a major factor in this trend. Bachrach, Advantageous Tax
Positions It Security Transactions, 25 TAXES 720 (1947); Wolder, The Dividend, 25
TAXES 911 (1947); Compensation and Inwentives for Industrial Executives, INDIANA
UNIvERsITY BUSINESS PLANNING PROJEcT No. 11. There is evidence, however, that lack
of control by the stockholders is also a factor. REPORT OF ANNUAL MEETING, STANDARD
OT. Co. OF NEW JErRSpY 28 (1949) (point was made that a contributing factor which ac-
counted for lack of risk capital was unrestricted control by director-officers) ; see note
23 supra.
1. Roman v. Smith, 42 F.2d 931 (D. Idaho 1930) ; Paine v. Wyatt, 217 Iowa 1147, 251
N. W. 78 (1933) ; McIntosh v. Atchison, etc., Ry. 109 Kan. 246, 198 Pac. 1084 (1921) ;
Vatalaro v. Thomas, 262 Mass. 363, 160 N. E. 269 (1928) ; Hanson v. Norton, 340 Mo.
1012, 103 S. W.2d 1 (1937) ; Burns v. Vilardo, 26 N. J. Misc. 277, 60 A.2d 94 (1948) ;
Polucha v. Landes, 60 N. D. 159, 233 N. W. 264 (1930) ; Alexander v. Von Wedel, 169
Okla. 341, 37 P.2d 252 (1934) ; McDonough v. Nat'l Hosp. Ass'n., 134 Ore. 451, 294 Pac.
351 (1930) ; Revell v. McGaughan, 162 Tenn. 532, 39 S. W.2d 269 (1931) ; Anderson v.
Allison, 12 Wash.2d 487, 122 P.2d 484 (1942) ; Ross v. Erickson Const. Co., 89 Wash.
634, 155 Pac. 153 (1916) ; Cf. McConnell v. Hames, 45 Ga. App. 307, 164 S. E. 476 (1932);
Hoover v. Globe Indemnity Co., 202 N. C. 655, 163 S. E. 758 (1932).
